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Abstract
Background: International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is
growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One
may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality
measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P
programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users
were involved in decisions about the P4P methods.
Methods: For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main
components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices
were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general
practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands.
Results: Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains
(clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of
assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care
was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be
calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance.
The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For
reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group
was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The
bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income.
Conclusions: Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight
into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line
with target users’ views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to
the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field
test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or
evaluating a P4P program.
Background
International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P)
initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing.
Despite the proliferation of P4P programs, the evidence
to support their use is still inconclusive [1,2]. One of
the reasons may be the differences between P4P pro-
grams. Incentives in current programs vary in terms of
number and type of indicators, professional standards
and quality domains (clinical care, patient experience,
organisation of care) [3-7]. The size of the incentive and
the unit of assessment in P4P programs can influence
their effectiveness [8]. Experiences with different P4P
programs led to a framework for design choices regard-
ing the P4P approach. Three essential framework
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components to design a P4P program can be distin-
guished: performance measurement, appraisal and reim-
bursement [9-12]. The performance measurement
should include valid and reliable indicators that make
sense to the target group. Appraisal in a P4P program
means defining the unit of assessment and the perfor-
mance standards, but also describing the analysis and
interpretation of the data. Based on the analysis and
interpretation of the data a reimbursement system can
be built [10].
Another remarkable feature of current P4P programs
is that they are mostly designed and implemented top-
down by policy makers and managers [13]. P4P pro-
grams can be seen as an innovation in care, and it is
known that the sustainability of an innovation can be
improved by involving target users [14]. It has also been
suggested to involve target users in the developmental
process of a P4P program, because this can contribute
to the effect of incentivized indicators [15,16]. A more
bottom-up procedure in designing a P4P program may
improve its future implementation and its effectiveness.
Evaluation of the involvement of target users in de
decisions about the P4P program may contribute to the
growing field of P4P research. One may assume that
involvement of health care professionals in the goal set-
ting and methods of quality measurement and subse-
quent payment schemes may enhance their
commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and
therefore the impact of these programs. Nevertheless,
you have to reckon with conflicts of interest when invol-
ving target users. Therefore it is important to develop
the P4P program in a systematic way, such as the Delphi
procedure [17]. The perspectives of all target users
become distinct, and the decisions made are transparent
for the target users. The aim of our study was to design
a P4P program using a bottom-up procedure, in which
the different options for performance measurement,
appraisal and reimbursement were discussed by the tar-
get users in a systematic consensus procedure. We will
present this bottom-up process of development of the
P4P program and its resulting design.
Methods
The design options in the P4P framework
We searched the literature for relevant elements for our
P4P program, to be discussed by the target users. Table
1 gives an overview of the elements and design options.
The performance indicators covered three domains,
clinical care, practice management and patient experi-
ence, and were derived from the Dutch National
Accreditation Program for general practices [18]. The
target users were asked whether these three domains,
the subjects and the indicators were appropriate for the
P4P program. For clinical care the target users could
choose from indicators for diabetes, COPD, asthma, car-
diovascular risk management, influenza vaccination, cer-
vical cancer screening and prescribing acid suppressive
drugs and antibiotics. For practice management, which
is measured with the validated Visitation Instrument
Practice management (VIP) [19], they could approve
various indicators for infrastructure, team, information,
and quality and safety. The indicators for patient experi-
ence to agree on were based on the internationally vali-
dated EUROPEP instrument [20], which evaluates both
the general practitioner and the organisation of care.
Furthermore, target users could decide on collecting
data for all three domains each year versus a trimmed-
down version of the program.
The appraisal and reimbursement elements and
options to be discussed were derived from the literature
[1,8,10,11]. The following design elements of P4P pro-
grams were described: unit of assessment, performance
standards, analysis and interpretation of performance
data, and financial rewards. The options for the unit of
assessment, either the general practitioner, the general
practice or a larger organisational unit, were presented
together with evidence that the smaller the unit the
stronger the stimulation of quality improvement [1], and
the practical consideration that the general practice is
the unit of assessment within the Dutch National
Accreditation program. The options presented for per-
formance standards were either absolute or relative per-
formance standards [10]. Most existing programs are
based on absolute standards [1,8,21]. The target users
were asked whether performance standards should vary
between indicators/subjects. Some indicators might need
lower minimum standards because they are more diffi-
cult to reach than others. Concerning the analysis and
interpretation of performance data the options were to
weight domains and indicators either differently or to
weigh them equally. In the Quality and Outcomes Fra-
mework (QOF), for instance, performance on clinical
indicators receives more weight than practice manage-
ment or patient experience [7]. For calculating quality
scores options were to either calculate a quality score
for each domain separately or to calculate one overall
domain-score. Moreover the target users could choose
whether both the quality level and the improvement of
performance should be incentivized and whether to
weigh the scores differently or equally. A combination
of incentives for both the quality level and improvement
of performance will encourage both low and high per-
forming providers to improve quality [1,16]. In order to
link a bonus to the quality, quality scores need to be dif-
ferentiated into levels. The options given were: 4 levels
(quartiles), 5 to 7 levels, or 8 to 10 levels. The more
levels, the more smaller improvements will be worth the
investment. For the feedback a discussion was started
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on a proper benchmark and on risk adjustment. The
options presented for a benchmark were the median,
the best practice (75th percentile or 90th percentile) or a
combination. Improvement can best be stimulated by
feedback in a reachable range [22], thus practices with
relatively low scores are stimulated by the average of the
peer group, and practices with high scores by best prac-
tices. Comparing practices with others without
appropriate risk adjustment can be misleading. Risk fac-
tors include patient demographic and/or clinical factors,
which can influence outcomes of care. The target users
had to decide on risk adjustment of the indicator scores,
which is either to adjust the benchmark (indirect correc-
tion) or the indicator scores (direct correction). Con-
cerning the feedback the target users could choose
either a one-step procedure or a two-step procedure. In
Table 1 Elements of the P4P program, design options and choices
Component Elements Design options Design choices P4P program
Performance
measurement
Performance
indicators
Domains, subjects
and indicators
Selection of:- Clinical care (diabetes, asthma, COPD,
cardiovascular risk management, influenza vaccination,
cervical cancer screening, prescribing acid suppressive
drugs and antibiotics)- Practice management
(infrastructure, team, information, quality and safety)-
Patient experience (experience with general
practitioner and organisation of care)
Selected indicators for:- Clinical care: diabetes (n =
9), asthma (n = 4), COPD (n = 5), cardiovascular risk
management (n = 9), influenza vaccination (n = 2),
cervical cancer screening (n = 1), prescribing
antibiotics (n = 2)- Practice management:
infrastructure (n = 7), team (n = 8), information (n =
3), quality and safety (n = 4)- Patient experience:
experience with general practitioner (n = 16) and
organisation of care (n = 11)
Period of data
collection
Data collection for all three domains each year vs. a
trimmed-down version of the program
At baseline measurement of clinical care, practice
management, patient experience; In following years
only clinical care and patient experience
Appraisal Unit of
assessment
Individual GP vs. general practice vs. larger
organisational unit
General practice
Performance
standards
• Absolute vs. relative standards
• Same standards vs. different standards for indicators/
subjects
• A relative standard set at the 25th percentile of
group performance
• Different standards for indicators
Analysis and
interpretation of
performance data
Weighing the
domains
Different weights vs. same weight Clinical care : practice management : patient
experience 2:1:1
Weighing the
indicators
Different weights vs. same weight Same weight for all indicators
Calculations • Separate scores for each domain vs. one overall
domain-score
• Calculations for quality level and/or improvement of
performance
• Separate scores for each domain
• Calculations for both quality level and
improvement of performance
Weighing the
quality scores
Different weights vs. same weight for quality level and
improvement of performance
Quality level : improvement of performance 3:1
Differentiation of
quality scores
4 levels vs. 5-7 levels vs. 8-10 levels 7 levels
Feedback • Benchmark: median vs. best practice (75th or 90th
percentile) vs. a combination
• Risk adjustment: indirect vs. direct correction
• One-step procedure vs. two-step procedure
• 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile
• No risk adjustment
• Two-step procedure
Reimbursement Financial rewards
Payment Money vs. human resources vs. sabbatical leave vs. a
combination
Money
Size of the bonus 5000 Euros to 10000 Euros (5-10% practice income)
on average per practice (depending on practice size)
® appropriate or not?
5000 Euros to 10000 Euros on average per practice
(depending on practice size)Baseline: A maximum of
euro 6.89 on average per patient*Following years: A
maximum of euro 2.88 on average per patient*
Spending the
bonus
No obligations vs. obligations (spending for practice
with or without pre-set goal) vs. a combination
No obligations
* A patient whose health insurance company was a sponsor of the P4P program
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the one-step procedure practices receive feedback and
bonus together. In the two-step procedure practices first
receive feedback, and receive the bonus only after they
have had the opportunity to respond to their feedback.
Concerning the reimbursement the options for the
method of payment were either money, human
resources, a sabbatical leave or a combination of these.
For the size of the bonus we asked the target users
whether an average bonus of 5000 to 10000 Euros
(depending on practice size), which is on average 5-10%
of the practice income, would be appropriate. In other
P4P programs the size of the bonus varied between US
$2 per patient and US$ 10000 per practice [23]. The
size of the bonus should not be too small as this may
limit the effects, but neither should it be too high
because of unintended consequences like gaming
[21,24,25]. The options for spending the bonus were
either without obligations or with obligations (spending
for the practice related to a goal, possibly preset) or a
combination of these options.
Study design
An action research approach [26] was applied with par-
ticipation of future target users in the development of
the P4P program. To reach consensus an adapted Del-
phi procedure [27] was used in two panels of target
users. (Figure 1) The target users in question were gen-
eral practitioners (GPs) and payers (representatives of
health insurance companies). General practices in the
South of the Netherlands were invited by the two regio-
nal health insurance companies to participate voluntarily
in this P4P experiment. We aimed at participation of 20
to 25 general practices, and at least one representative
of each health insurance company. To achieve consen-
sus on the P4P design, two rounds were organized to
discuss the methods of performance measurements (one
on clinical care, and one on practice management and
patient experience) and one round to discuss the meth-
ods of appraisal and reimbursement. The participating
practices were also invited to volunteer in a field test in
which data were collected based on the previous choices
for the measurement of clinical performance, practice
management and patient experiences. Feedback to the
practices was delivered and the resulting bonus was paid
according to the system agreed on. After the field test
the panel was extended with general practices that were
also willing to participate in this P4P experiment. In this
second panel we discussed the methods of appraisal and
reimbursement based on the results of the field test
(round four) and the design options regarding quality
level and improvement of performance (round five) to
fine-tune the P4P program.
Consensus procedure
In each round a written questionnaire with the design
options for the P4P program was sent to the target
users two weeks before the planned meeting. In the
questionnaire they were provided with background evi-
dence on the options as described in the section ‘The
design options in the P4P framework’ and they were
asked to make a choice. Each meeting started with
explaining the aim of the discussion and feedback on
the results of the questionnaires. All design options
were discussed, but for the performance indicators the
project team decided not to discuss indicators with high
consensus, defined as less than 30% or more than 70%
in favour. At the end of each meeting the panel mem-
bers completed the same questionnaire again. The deci-
sion rule for inclusion of clinical indicators was set at
more than 70% in favour, and for the other design
options a majority rule was applied.
All panel meetings were held in the region in question
to enhance participation. Payers and GPs attended the
same discussion meetings which lasted 2 hours. The
general practices in the first panel received 1500 Euros
for participating in the panel as well as in the field test.
Each GP in the second panel received 100 Euros for
attending the meetings.
Results
Study population
The number of general practitioners and health insur-
ance representatives that filled in the questionnaires and
attended the meetings for the specific panels are pre-
sented in Figure 1. The number of GPs that could
attend the meetings in round four and five were
restricted to 30 due to the large number of practices
that voluntarily participated in the P4P program. In
panel 1 the response rate for the GPs was on average
93% for the questionnaires and 78% for the meetings,
and in panel 2 71% and 50% respectively. The health
insurance representatives decided to leave the discussion
on the performance indicators to the experts (GPs).
They participated amply in panel 1 and their participa-
tion decreased in panel 2.
Design choices
The successive panel procedures and the field test
resulted in a P4P program which is presented in Table
1.
Performance measurement
The target users thought clinical care, practice manage-
ment and patient experience to be appropriate domains
for the P4P program, as well as the subjects within
Kirschner et al. BMC Family Practice 2012, 13:25
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these domains (see Table 1). Some GPs remarked that
the clinical conditions to be assessed were mainly
focused on chronic care, though GP care comprises
much more. Especially communication skills were
missed. Although patient experiences were to be
assessed, some GPs stated that communication was not
reflected enough in the indicators. The GPs also dis-
cussed the fact that choosing indicators would result in
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Figure 1 Procedure design selection of a P4P program by target users.
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a certain focus that could distract them from the more
general goal of quality improvement. Practices may con-
centrate their performance on the indicators from the
P4P program. It was proposed that in the long-term a
large set of indicators will be needed. Then the P4P pro-
gram could have different sets for different years. Some
GPs even suggested that the practice should not be
aware of the existing set. For clinical care, GPs were
convinced that the outcomes were a mixed result of
patient and doctor’s performance. It was therefore
decided that the payment should be based on the pro-
cess measures only, but the GPs would like to receive
feedback on the outcome indicators as well. So, data for
both process and outcome indicators were collected.
Although the health insurance representatives stated
they would leave the decisions on clinical care options
to the GPs, they joined the discussion in the meetings
on the prescription indicators. The prescription indica-
tors were highly valued by the health insurance repre-
sentatives. The GPs questioned these indicators which
resulted in not including the acid suppressive drugs
indicators in the program, and including indicators on
prescribing antibiotics. Some items of practice manage-
ment were excluded due to their estimated low correla-
tion with the quality of practice management such as
financial accounting. The EUROPEP instrument, con-
sisting of 23 items measuring patient experience, was
supplemented with four items regarding the possibility
to ask for a longer consultation, accessibility by phone,
getting an appointment with your own doctor and an
accessible procedure for complaints. All selected quality
indicators can be found in additional file 1.
The target users agreed that at baseline, data should
be collected for all three domains. For the years to fol-
low the data collection for the practice management
domain was judged to be unnecessary as it is not likely
that this will change substantially over two or three
years and as the data collection in this domain is very
labour-intensive.
Appraisal
The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment,
because in the context of the P4P program the incentive
would be targeted at this level. Since the data on clinical
performance were collected at individual GP level, prac-
tices asked to receive feedback at the level of the GP as
well. Relative standards for determining the level of the
incentive were preferred over absolute standards by
most target users. Setting an absolute standard for per-
formance was considered too arbitrary. They preferred
performance standards for both indicators and subjects,
but as this would not contribute to the clarity of the cal-
culations it was decided to restrict it to the indicators
only. They agreed to set the relative performance stan-
dard at the 25th percentile of each indicator. This
responded to the preference of the panel members to
vary the performance standards between the indicators.
The target users thought that all individual indicators
should receive the same weight because a good criterion
for differentiating was lacking. However, they decided
that clinical care should receive double the weight of
practice management and patient experience (2:1:1)
because clinical care is the major domain of quality of
care. The data from the 22 practices in the field test
showed that the quality scores should be calculated
separately for each domain because otherwise the per-
formance on clinical care would dominate the overall
quality score. Having data available for two or more
years made it possible to calculate improvement of per-
formance as well. Panel 2 decided to reward quality
level as well as improvement of performance in a ratio
of 3:1 for the bonus payment in the next year. In that
case practices with high scores would receive a bonus
for delivering quality and practices with low scores
would be stimulated to improve. In the following years
two separate scores will be calculated for each practice;
one on quality level and one on improvement of perfor-
mance for the three domains clinical care, practice man-
agement and patient experience. The panel thought of
the P4P program as a three years cycle in which practice
management was only measured at the beginning of
each cycle. The users preferred to have a detailed divi-
sion in levels of quality scores to make small differences
in quality visible and to make it easier to achieve next
levels. The range of quality scores of all participating
practices were therefore divided into seven equal levels
(relative ‘thresholds’). Practices that do not improve will
be rated in level 0 (no bonus) and practices showing
improvement will be rated in one of six levels with a
differentiation in bonus accordingly. For feedback the
target users preferred a benchmark with the 25th (mini-
mum standard), 50th and the 75th percentile because
that would give them a good overview and stimulate
practices at the bottom as well as at the top. Risk adjust-
ment for the process indicators was discussed. The tar-
get users preferred stratification, which is a comparison
with a benchmark consisting of comparable practices
instead of correction of their own data. However, strati-
fication would require a large sample of practices, so we
decided not to include this aspect in the experiment.
Following the experiences with the field test, a two-step
procedure was chosen by the GPs. Practices will receive
feedback (indicator scores and benchmark) and the
bonus after they have had the opportunity to respond to
their feedback. The feedback was accompanied with
clear information on the calculation procedure.
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Reimbursement
The discussion on the type of financial reward resulted
in the conclusion: “Money is the best method, because
money can buy you anything”. The target users agreed
on a bonus that was 5 to 10% of practice income with a
minimum of 0 Euros and a maximum of 15000 Euros.
None of the users indicated this amount was too high
and half of them thought this was too low. However,
agreement was reached with the argument that the pro-
posed size of the bonus was in line with bonuses paid in
trade and industry. A decline in the bonus for the years
to follow had to do with the budget of the health insur-
ance companies who rationalized it by arguing that the
data collection was most labour intensive at the start of
the project. According to the discussion on the appraisal
we need two formulas to calculate the bonus, one on
the quality level and one on quality improvement level.
The quality improvement level can only be calculated
after the first year. The formulas are:
Bonus practice (i)on quality level (QL) = 3(2 ∗ clinical care QL (x) + patient experience QL
(
y
)
+ practice management QL (z)) ∗ number of patients in practice insured by payers
Bonus practice (i) on quality improvement level (QIL) = (2 ∗ clinical care QIL (x) + patient experience QIL
(
y
)
) ∗ number of patients in practice insured by payers
The exact bonus at baseline and in following years is
presented in Table 2. The maximum bonus in year 1 is
6.890 Euros per 1000 patients (which is on average 7500
Euros for a practice with 2350 patients) and in the fol-
lowing years 2.880 Euros. Target users found that for-
mulating explicit criteria for spending the bonus was
not necessary. Rewarding good quality versus penalizing
poor quality was discussed in the panel as well, but
proved to be not applicable at this stage of the P4P
program.
Discussion
P4P proves to be a complex innovation and knowledge
needs to be acquired over time [10]. Assuming a
greater probability of acceptance of P4P programs and
subsequent quality improvement, our study contri-
butes to this field by describing the design choices of
target users when they themselves are involved in
developing a P4P program. We succeeded in involving
the target users in the lively discussions about design
options. They were very much involved in the discus-
sions and in the field test; the response rate in the
panels was high. We managed to reach consensus and
to define a P4P program for primary care in the
Netherlands.
In line with other P4P programs our target users
selected performance indicators for clinical care, practice
management and patient experience. It was not surpris-
ing that the chronic diseases were chosen for the pro-
gram concerning the attention for these diseases and
concerning the health care costs due to these diseases.
However, our program seems to be more balanced com-
pared to other programs with regard to the position of
patient experiences in the program [3,5-7]. GPs indi-
cated that they wanted the patient to be more central in
the program because patient communication is a core
task. Nevertheless, they wanted clinical care to be
weighted more heavily than patient experience to reduce
the chance of being solely judged on patient experi-
ences. Here the consequences of the choices seem to
overrule the principles.
Mostly, P4P programs are designed and implemented
top-down by policy makers and service managers [13].
In our study both GPs and health insurance companies
were involved in the development of the program. Inter-
estingly, the health insurance representatives did not
want to discuss the content of clinical care and allowed
the GPs to decide on this domain. In other programs
the payers had a more decisive role in the development
of a P4P program or were not involved in any way.
Though the effectiveness of P4P programs is still incon-
clusive, we assume that our approach enhances the
commitment and motivation of general practices and
therefore the impact of our program.
Table 2 Bonus per patient for the first year and the following years for each domain and quality (improvement) level
Baseline bonus for clinical care, practice management and patient experience per patient
Quality score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Clinical care Quality level € 0 € 0.83 € 1.33 € 1.87 € 2.37 € 2.95 € 3.45
Practice management Quality level € 0 € 0.41 € 0.66 € 0.94 € 1.19 € 1.47 € 1.72
Patient experience Quality level € 0 € 0.41 € 0.66 € 0.94 € 1.19 € 1.47 € 1.72
Bonus in following years for clinical care and patient experience per patient
Quality score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Clinical care Quality level € 0 € 0.25 € 0.50 € 0.75 € 1.00 € 1.25 € 1.50
Quality improvement € 0 € 0.07 € 0.14 € 0.21 € 0.28 € 0.35 € 0.42
Patient experience Quality level € 0 € 0.12 € 0.25 € 0.37 € 0.50 € 0.62 € 0.75
Quality improvement € 0 € 0.03 € 0.07 € 0.10 € 0.14 € 0.17 € 0.21
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The target users had a realistic estimate of the
required size of the bonus in order to achieve a quality
stimulus. According to the target users a bonus of on
average 5-10% of practice income was considered to be
appropriate. The target users were aware of the risk of
gaming when the incentive is too high [21,24,25]. Our
bonus is much smaller than the incentive in the UK
which makes up approximately 25% of GPs’ income [4].
The target users opted for relative P4P standards.
Until now, programs mainly base their incentives on
absolute performance standards [1,3,5,6,8,28]. An advan-
tage of relative standards is that health insurers can
remain within their budget. This is in contrast to the
UK P4P program, for example [29]. Furthermore quality
scores of all participating practices were divided into
seven levels. These series of tiered thresholds have
attainable goals for each practice; a known effective sti-
mulus for changing behaviour [30]. According to the
target users both quality level and improvement of per-
formance need to be incentivized. This will stimulate
practices with a high performance as well as practices
with a low performance [1]. This is in contrast with
other P4P programs in which nearly always good perfor-
mance instead of improvement is rewarded [11].
Strengths and limitations of the study
The strength of our study lies in its developmental pro-
cess, assuming a greater probability of acceptance of the
program and subsequent quality improvement. Involving
the target users resulted in good discussions and consen-
sus about the design options. The field test was performed
successfully as part of the procedure. Many practices parti-
cipated in the field test as well as in the panels, which
resulted in a reasonably balanced P4P program.
This study has some limitations. First, due to time
constraints patients were not included in the design of
the P4P program. However, they had been previously
involved in discussions about the objectives of the
Dutch accreditation program, which was part of the
initial framework of our program. Second, there is a
drop in the number of participants in panel 2. A possi-
ble explanation is that the subjects we discussed in
panel 2 were more restricted and detailed and therefore
less attractive than those in panel 1. Third, practices
could voluntarily register for this experiment, which
may have resulted in overrepresentation of early adop-
ters of a P4P program. It is important that the early
majority as well as later on the late majority support the
P4P program. To involve them in design choices that
are acceptable and applicable is still a challenge.
Strengths and limitations of the design choices
A strength of the design choices is the involvement of
the target users. The behavioral change of the P4P
program is therefore grounded in extrinsic (reimburse-
ment) as well as intrinsic motivation. To stimulate the
motivation further the feedback will be discussed within
the practice supported by a facilitator.
The performance measures do not cover all aspects of
general practice. Just stimulating the incentivized parts
of the performance can result in a possible decline in
quality of care of the non-incentivized aspect [31]. By
discussing which aspects will be stimulated in the forth-
coming period, we assume that this effect is somewhat
lower in our P4P program.
GPs have decided that the outcome indicators on clin-
ical care will not be incentivized, and the health insur-
ance companies agreed. We have to study the effect of
this decision on the outcome indicators. By incentivizing
the process indicators an indirect effect is expected on
the reported outcome measures, but that still has to be
proven.
As in other P4P programs the focus of the clinical
performance measures is on the chronic conditions. Pol-
icy makers show a lot of interest in the performance on
these conditions, resulting in several improvement pro-
jects. This might have an effect on our baselines mea-
sures in which case the room for improvement
decreases. In our effect study we will take into account
the baseline measures to get more insight into this
problem.
The relative thresholds might evoke calculating beha-
vior, that is if no one improves the bonus will still be
dived. The question is which practice will take this risk.
This design choice introduces a prisoner’s dilemma with
unclear results. Although, based on the involvement of
the participating GPs in quality of care we would
assume that in this group the urge of improvement is
larger. The sustainability of the relative thresholds can
become tensed in a broader probably less involved
group of GPs.
The health insurance companies decided together with
the GPs on the available budget for the bonus. However,
after the first bonus was allocated, the health insurance
companies started the discussion on the bonus again.
They suggested that the data collection was much easier
in the following year, and therefore the bonus could be
reduced. This lead to a lot of turbulence among the par-
ticipating GPs. No consensus was reached, but the prac-
tices were still willing to participate. This is a
demonstration of the inequity in the relation between
payers and GPs that is hard to cover with a consensus
procedure.
The sustainability of the P4P program is also stressed
if the performance measures stay the same each cycle,
because the indicators scores increase due to the P4P
program to a certain optimum. This phenomenon has
been described with the UK-QOF data [4]. To prevent
Kirschner et al. BMC Family Practice 2012, 13:25
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this effect it was discussed that the P4P program will
need constant trimming, recalibrating and balancing to
ensure that the objectives are being met at the right
costs and without too many unwanted effects. This
means that subjects and/or indicators will be replaced
with others when performance on the subjects reaches a
certain level. This will also prevent a narrow focus on
quality of care in general practice. The adjustments of
the P4P program should again be based on discussions
with the target users.
Conclusions
By performing a procedure to involve target users in
designing a P4P program for general practice, a detailed
framework to define design choices was established.
This framework as well as the insight into motives for
design choices of the target users can be helpful for
others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program.
The resulting design resembled the P4P programs from
other countries, but ours was also in line with target
users’ views and assessments of relevance and applicabil-
ity. As already shown by the growing number of volun-
tary participants during the study, this may enhance
general practitioner’s commitment to the program.
Additional material
Additional file 1: The indicator set of the P4P program.
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